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1. Introduction 
The driving theme of cognitive modeling for many decades has been that knowledge 
affects how and which goals are accomplished by an intelligent being (Newell 199 1). But 
when one examines groups of people living and working together, one is forced to 
recognize that whose knowledge is called into play, at a particular time and location, 
directly affects what the group accomplishes. Indeed, constraints on participation, 
including roles, procedures, and norms, affect whether an individual is able to act at all 
(Lave & Wenger 199 1 ; Jordan 1992; Scribner & Sachs 199 1). 
To understand both individual cognition and collective activity, perhaps the greatest 
opportunity today is to integrate the cognitive modeling approach (which stresses how 
beliefs are formed and drive behavior) with social studies (which stress how relationships 
and informal practices drive behavior). The crucial insight is that norms are 
conceptualized in the individual &nd as ways of carrying out activities (Clancey 1997a, 
2002b). This requires for the psychologist a shift from only modeling goals and tasks - 
why people do what they dw-to modeling behavioral patterns-what people do-as they 
are engaged in purposeful activities. Instead of a model that exclusively deduces actions 
from goals, behaviors are also, if not primarily, driven by broader patterns of 
chronological and located activities (akin to scripts). 
This analysis is particular inspired by activity theory (Leont’ev 1979). While 
acknowledging that knowledge (relating goals and operations) is fundamental for 
intelligent behavior, activity theory claims that a broader driver is the person’s motives 
and conceptualization of activities. Such understanding of human interaction is normative 
(i.e., viewed with respect to social standards), affecting how knowledge is called into 
play and applied in practice. Put another way, how problems are discovered and framed, 
what methods are chosen, and indeed who even cares or has the authority to act, are all 
constrained by norms, which are conceived and enacted by individuals. 
Of special interest for the cognitive modeler, and emphasized in social theory (Lave 
1988), is how norms are reinforced and shaped through behavior. Each enacting of a 
norm potentially reinforces the behavior pattern for the individual, as well as the group 
observing and relating to the behavior. But also, each action potentially changes the 
norm, including functional adaptations to the current circumstances as well as personal 
whim. One might refer to understanding of norms as an individual’s “social knowledge”; 
but many or perhaps most norms are tacit-the patterns are not necessarily experienced 
or described. Of major interest for cognitive modeling is how individuals formulate 
situation-action rules of behavior (ie., they develop models of norms) to deliberately 
accomplish goals in novel ways (Le., they deduce how to relate and adapt available 
methods to permissible behaviors). For example, a leader may develop the group’s 
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capability by humorously violating a norm, reinforcing each individual’s understanding 
of the group’s structure and ways of interacting. 
Our understanding of how to relate goals, knowledge, behaviors, and social concepts 
in a cognitive model has been developing over more than a decade in the Brahms 
modeling and simulation system (Clancey et al. 1998, 2002b; Sierhuis 2001). It has taken 
a long time to break out of the task analysis perspective to understanding the social 
notion of activity (Lave 1988; Suchman 1987) as a behavioral and not functional 
description, and to ground it in a cognitive architecture. The significant breakthroughs 
included: 
= Understanding activities as patterns of what people do, when, and where, using 
what tools or representations; . Representing activities in a co-gitive model using a subsumption architecture 
(i.e., conceptualization of activities occurs simultaneously on multiple levels); . Understanding that conceptualization of activities is tantamount to 
conceptualization of .identity, “What I’m doing now,” which is the missing link 
between psychological z d  socizl theery (Clancey 1997, 1999; Wenger 1998). 
Simulating collective behavior in a multi-agent simulation with an explicit 
“geographic model” of places and facilities, using the Brahms tool. 
A Brahms model is a way of formalizing (expressing, collecting, and organizing) field 
observations so they can be correlated, shared, and used in work system design (Sierhuis 
& Clancey 2002b; Sierhuis et al. 2003; Seah, Sierhuis & Clancey in preparation). The 
primary objective is not necessarily to construct a predictive model of human behavior, 
which is often emphasized in scientific modeling, including cognitive modeling, but to 
have a systematic way of relating disparate sources of information, including video, 
notes, and surveys. 
To illustrate these ideas, this chapter presents an extract from a Brahms simulation of 
the Flashline Mars Arctic Research Station ( F U R S ) ,  in which a crew of six people are 
living and working for a week, physically simulating a Mars surface mission (Clancey 
2002a). This Brahms simulation of this mission is broadly described in Clancey (2002b); 
this chapter focuses on one part, the Brahms simulation of a planning meeting. How 
people behave during the meeting (eg., standing at the table) exemplifies the nature of 
norms; this is modeled at the individual agent level in Brahms. The example shows how 
physiological constraints (e.g., hunger, fatigue), facilities (e.g., the habitat’s layout), and 
group decision making interact. This chapter describes the methodology for constructing 
such a model of practice, from video and first-hand observation, and how this modeling 
approach fundamentally changes how one relates goals, knowledge, and cognitive 
architecture. 
Following the analytic approach of Schon (1987), this research effort shifts from 
studying technical knowledge in isolation to modeling the context in which behavior 
occurs and how it unfolds over time through interactions of people, places, and tools. The 
resulting simulation model of practice is a powerful complement to task analysis and 
knowledge-based simulations of reasoning, with many practical applications for work 
system design, operations management, and training. 
. 
2. The Brahms Approach for Relating Cognitive and Social Processes 
The Brahrns simulation system was developed as a means of systematically relating 
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information gained fi-om the anthropological method of observing by participating in 
some activity, called “participant observation” (Spradley 1980; Clancey in preparation a, 
b). Being a participant allows the observer to detect and understmd events that people 
would not otherwise report (e.g., a swimmer would probably not mention “you have to be 
in water; alive.” Wynn 1991, p. 49). Brahms’ patented design was conceived in 1992 to 
complement business process modeling tools by representing how work actually gets 
done. As a model of practice, in contrast with formal processes, Brahms simulations 
emphasize informal communications and assistance (Le., actions that are not specified in 
task requirements or procedures), and circumstantial interactions (e.g. , how placement of 
people and tools affects what information is shared or how long a job takes). 
~ 
~ 
The Brahms modeling language enables representing and relating: . 
’ 
’ 
. . 
people (as agents having beliefs, factual properties, and belonging to one or more 
groups) 
locations (as a hierarchy of geographic areas) 
tools and furniture (represented as objects having factual properties) 
computer systems (e.g., databases. represented as objects with stored beliefs that 
can be read or modified by agents) 
robotic systems (represented as agents) 
behavior of people and systems (represented as activities). 
Activities are represented as prioritized situation-action rules called workframes and 
conditional inference rules called thoughtfi-ames. Workframes have four parts: 
9 
’ . . 
preconditions (matched against agent beliefs) 
actions (activities or primitive actions) . 
detectables (conditions associated with actions, modeling perception of the world) 
consequences (changes to beliefs and the state of the world). 
Primitive actions occur for a fixed, specified duration. The simulation engine manages 
agent and object behaviors as a discrete event simulation. 
The state of the world (physical properties of agents and objects) is modeled in 
Brahms as facts. Detectables match against facts, resulting in agent beliefs (which may be 
different from the facts), modeling how what is perceived is conditional on what an agent 
is doing. Changed beliefs then activate workframes for the activities in which the agent is 
currently engaged. Detectables may also abort or complete an activity. Thus, agent 
behaviors are largely data-driven within the context of activities. The language provides 
two special primitive actions: Move (to a specified location, taking a particular time) and 
Communicate (ask or tell another agent a belief matching a specified proposition, which 
applies as well to reading and writing beliefs to an object, e.g., a computer screen). 
An agent is engaged in a hierarchy of activities at any particular time, constituting a 
subsumption architecture. For example, an FMARS crew member might be 
ParticipatingInPlanningMeeting while ConductingPlanningMeeting during the course of 
LivingOneDayinTheMarsHabitat. The agent is doing all of these activities at a particular 
moment, and thus a stack of activities is always active for every agent. The workframes 
and thoughtframes of these activities may activate, depending on the agents beliefs and 
the priorities of the workframes. Furthermore, any of the detectables on the current line of 
workframe activation may be triggered, according to the facts in the world that the agent 
encounters (subject to area and line of sight restrictions). Workfi-ames may thus be 
interrupted or resumed as the agent behaves, gets new beliefs, and modifies the world. 
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Furthermore, the initial beliefs of the agent, as well as the potential activities are inherited 
by group membership. Groups may belong to groups, providing an efficient way of 
representing beliefs and behaviors. 
The Brahms language, architecture, and simulation engine are described in detail by 
Sierhuis (2001). Besides the original simulations of office work (Clancey et al. 1998) 
constructed for NYNEX (the former New York New England telephone company), 
Brahms has been used to model NASA’s mission operations, deployment of instruments 
on the lunar surface by Apollo astronauts (Sierhuis 200 l), how procedures are followed 
on the International Space Station (Acquisiti et al. 2002), activities of scientists 
controlling the Mars Exploration Rovers (MER) (Seah, Sierhuis, & Clancey in 
preparation), and teleoperations from earth of a proposed lunar rover (Sierhuis et al. 
Before examining the Brahms model of the FMARS planning meeting, a few aspects 
2003). 
of activity-based modeling should be emphasized: 
n 
A model of activity is a model of practice, what people do. It should be contrasted 
with idealized or witten models of procechres (what people are sgpposed to do). 
Tasks and activities are different units for viewing and describing human 
behavior. Like functional and behavioral models of artifacts such as electronic 
circuits, a task model can be related to, but does not strictly map onto an activity 
model. Most notably, many activities, such as eating, which can occur at any time 
during work, are omitted from task models. Simply put, a task model describes 
input and output relations as a kind of idealized specification of what should be 
accomplished. An activity model describes located, chronological behaviors and 
perceptual experiences. See Clancey (2002b) for extensive discussion and 
comparison of task analysis to Brahms, especially the historical relation to scripts. 
The emphasis on modeling behavior is not the same as behaviorism. Agent 
actions are totally driven by their perceptions, beliefs, and conceptualization of 
activities (represented by workframes and thoughtfiames). 
Brahms activities are models of conceptualizations-which are largely non- 
verbal. Models of activities are quite different from the models of technical 
information and task-oriented procedures in knowledge-based systems. 
Brahms models are first and foremost investigators’ models, not necessarily 
patterns articulated by the people being modeled. However, by incorporating 
agent beliefs (perhaps unarticulated), perception, conditional actions, and 
inferences, Brahms models have many characteristics of cognitive models. 
An agent’s beliefs include. how other people relate to activities, objects, and 
procedures, that is, social knowledge. 
Attitude, emotion, and personality are of fundamental importance in 
understanding human activity, but are not included in the FMARS model. For 
example, the crew’s attitude towards each other is revealed by their posture and 
spacing around the meeting table. These characteristics of people are essential for 
the application domain of long-duration space missions. In related work the 
FMARS data and simulation is being used to understand what aspects of 
personality for example are relevant in understanding the crew’s behavior. 
Broadly speaking, a person’s activities are identities. For example, one crew 
member was simultaneously being an American woman, a graduate student in 
4 
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geophysics at MIT, an FLWRS crew member , and a person attending a planning 
meeting. These identities are dynamically composed and blended conceptions of 
“what I‘m doing now,” such that norms at each level are tacitly attended to and 
integrated (Clancey 1999; 2002b). 
= Both formal structures ( e g ,  roles and procedures) and informal, emergent 
interactions (e.g., friendship) are part of the conceptualization of activity, but 
rules are always only consciously interpreted guides, not rigid controllers of 
behavior, as in computer programs.’ Observing and documenting how preplanned 
procedures are adapted in practice is a central part of understanding the nature and 
role of cognition in the real world (Suchman 1987). 
3. Simulation Model of Mars Crew Planning Meeting 
Developing a Brahms model of a planning meeting exploited a unique opportunity and 
involved many steps: 
m 
m 
A crew of six people was living in the Mars analog mission for a week (at 
FMARS on Devon Island in the Canadian Arctic during July 200i). 
Clancey was selected to participate in the mission as a member of the crew 
(serving as journalist and meteorologist). 
The crew’s activities were systematically observed -and recorded. 
Time-lapse video was analyzed to map out patterns of what people did, when, and 
where. 
Selected multi-agent interactions were simulated (a planning meeting, filling the 
water tank; and preparing to work outside-an extra-vehicular activity, EVA). 
The Brahms simulation was integrated with a graphic rendering of agent postures, 
movements, object manipulations, etc. in the Brahms Virtual Environment 
(BrahmsVE) described in this chapter, implemented in Adobe@ AtmosphereTM (a 
commercially available, browser-based rendering engine). 
The simulation was refined by analyzing and further specifying the interaction of 
physiological, cognitive, and social structures (referring to the time-lapse video, 
photoqaphs, and ethnographic . . - - . .. field notes). 
Over the course of a week, an FMkRS participant observer can induce the typical 
pattern of the day, including what individuals do at different locations habitually. One 
approach is to keep an accumulating outline that is revised each day as part of the 
In this form, situated cognition concerns the dynamic nature of human memory: 
Knowledge does not consist of stored structures such as rules and procedures that are 
indexed, retrieved, and subconsciously executed as in the Von Neumann computer 
architecture. In general, social scientists promoting situated cognition in the 1980s did not 
present alternative neural arguments, and used sometimes confusing language (e.g., “The 
point is not so much that arrangements of knowledge in the head correspond in a 
complicated way to the social world outside the head, but that they are socially organized 
in such as a fashion as to be indivisible,” Lave 1988.) Some claims were absurdly 
interpreted by some researchers as “there is no knowledge in the head.” For examples and 
discussion see Clancey (1 993 ; 1994; 1 995; especially, 1997, “Remembering 
Controversies,” Chapter 3). 
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observer’s field notes. The resulting Brahms model has a hierarchical activity structure, 
shown here chronologically: 
LivingOneDayinTheMar sHabitat 
Sleeping 
GoingToRestroom 
Moving To Area 
GettingUp 
EatingBreakfast 
HeatingWater 
BringingBreakfast 
DoingPersonalItemsAfierBreakfast 
StartingPlanningMeeting 
AnnouncingReadinessForPlanning 
Gathering 
ChattingBeforePlanning 
Announcing S tartOP lanning 
ParticipatingInPlanningMeeting 
ConductingPlanningMeeting 
CoveringAgendaItem Weather 
CoveringAgendaItemWater 
AnnouncingEndO PlanningMeeting 
ConductingEVAPreparation 
Donning Suit 
DepressurizingInChamber 
ConductingEVA 
Eating Snack 
TakingNap 
Many details in the model are omitted here, such as the steps in donning the suit and 
activities relating to specific roles and tasks (e.g., working with particular laboratory 
equipment). 
The present model of the FMARS planning meeting does not attempt to replicate the 
conversational details of how people plan in a group by articulating and negotiating 
alternatives. As will become clear, there are many other issues to consider in simulating a 
planning meeting. The topics of the planning meeting, such as discussing the weather and 
reviewing the habitat’s systems (power, water), are modeled as a sequence of events, with 
fixed durations. Even within such a restricted framework, individual agents can 
opportunistically change the topic (a subactivity) of the meeting or carry out a given 
subactivity in a way that changes what other agents are doing. For example, if there is a 
fire alarm, the meeting will be interrupted and the activity of responding to the alarm 
would begin. This flexibility results from the combination of detectables, thoughtfiames, 
communications, inheritance of activities through group membership, and the 
subsumption architecture for interrupting and resuming activities. 
Subsequent sections explain in more detail how the planning meeting model is created 
and what its structure reveals about the relation of cognition and social behavior. 
, 
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3.1 Planning Meeting Time Lapse 
Using methods developed over several expedition field seasons (Clancey 200 I), Clancey 
systematically recorded most of several days using a time-lapse apparatus. A quarter- 
frame (320x240 pixels) wide-angle view (Figure 1) was captured direct to computer disk 
every 3 seconds, such that the entire upper deck outside of the staterooms is visible. 
These frames were manually abstracted in a spreadsheet to show where people are 
(columns) at different times (rows)2. From this, statistics and graphs are generated. 
Meetings such as the morning planning meeting are often video-recorded in full, so the 
conversations can also be analyzed. 
Figure 1. FMARS planning meeting of July 13, 2001, after KQ has moved 
from far left seat to standing on right. Commander sits on one long side of the 
table; Clancey is on the right. Ladder to lower deck is out of camera range on 
far left; staterooms are to far right. 
The following are some typical observations about how people sit and stand at different 
places and times. These are all based on the time lapse of July 13, 2001. The identity of 
individuals is part of the public record (the meeting was filmed by the Discovery 
Channel); initials are used here. 
[09: 17: 141 Everyone is at the table, and the meeting is started (then KQ and BC 
leave to get notebooks and clothing). Prior to this point there were never more 
than three people sitting at the table, although at different points in time the 
informal, pre-meeting conversation was joined by CC (at workstation), SB (at 
galley cabinet), and KQ (by the table). 
1) 
Foster-Miller, Inc. has been funded by NASA to develop the Crew Activity Analyzer, 
which uses image processing to automate most of the time-lapse analysis. 
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H2O 
Weather emaii 
2) Outside the formal meeting, SB rarely sits, while CC never leaves his 
workstation (aside from getting a drink). Those two appear to represent two 
ends of a volatility spectrum. CC works on one project, his paper; SB has many 
problems with the satellite network, walkie-talkies, power, etc. to resolve. 
Later in the day, people spend relatively long times standing and pacing around 
the table: KQ ([11:54:49 - [11:55:52]); SB ( [11:55:40] - [12:16:01]); CC ( 
[12:06:53] - [12:08:59]). BC also has his notepad on the table, to which he 
returns periodically and mdces notes while standing. The chairs are obviously 
still available, but they have been moved to workstation and the lab on the lower 
deck, where they "belong," and nobody returns them to the table. 
[15:01:24] VP sets up his laptop on the wardroom table, even though there is 
plenty of space available at workstation area (only two people are there). At 
[15:16:55], all but SI3 are sitting at their laptops. 
3 )  
4) 
A graph of the planning meeting (Figure 2) reveals some surprising patterns and 
provides a basis for characterizing Sehzvicr in terns of norm. 
Meeting begins 
9:17:47 
cc 
SB 
VP 
KQ 
I '  
9:15:17 
Call to order 
Closure begins 
10:01:11 
I 
9:34:12 
Food breaks.. 
Ending 
10:11:30 
BC 
Figure 2. Location of crew members during planning meeting. The timeline is 
broken into two parts, starting at top left. Color indicates seated at table, 
otherwise the activity is indicated. See text for analysis. 
To understand what one needs to know about the structure of the meeting in order to 
simulate it, consider the problem of representing the locations and postures of the 
individual agents. At a first order evaluation of simulation fidelity, before the model can 
be used to explain what is happening, the interacting agent behaviors must visibly 
resemble real life. This means that the graphic simulation must appear plausible to 
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someone familiar with such settings. For example, it would be implausible to have the six 
people taking their chairs simultaneously or leaving at the same moment-any crew 
member how-s  this never occurs. 
The chart reveals what kinds of events are plausible, though they may still be 
unexpected to analysts because people do not necessarily reflect on even highly 
structured social behavior. Thus one observes a kind of “vetoing” of the meeting start 
when BC leaves his chair, just as RZ calls the meeting to order, which is the moment 
when SB and KB have sat for the first time. Shortly after, RZ (meeting organizer) and VP 
leave. RZ begins the meeting when BC returns; simultaneously CC spins his chair around 
(waiting to the last moment to leave his personal work). Equally interesting is that KQ 
stands during about a third of the meeting, after reheating her drink in the microwave. 
This establishes a norm for the group: It is permissible to stand during the meeting, at 
least near the food area. -4t the very end of the meeting RZ stands and holds his chair in a 
way that appears to signify an ending. If someone were to stand and hold hisher chair in 
the same way in the middle of the meeting, it might appear that they are planning to leave 
for a moment, for example to gc to the bat,hoom. VP & BC return to tzble after checking 
water (signifying that the meeting is not over). CC turns his chair around as the meeting 
ends, although two people remain at the table. 
In short, modeling how individual agents carry out a group activity, as conditional 
actions organized into activity conceptualizations, begins to reveal how collective (social) 
behavior relates to individual cognition (involving perception, motive, and action). 
However, common sense knowledge about social behavior is far more complex than has 
been modeled in Brahms. In addition, social theorists (e.g.> Lave 1988) suggest that every 
action within a group involves learning for all participants: Norms are being reinforced 
through their reproduction, but also adapted and even purposefully violated (e.g., for 
humor to c o n f m  or deny emotional relationships). The FMARS simulation does not 
represent ths  learning (i.e., reinforcement or adaptation of workframes). Other social 
analyses suggest (Wenger 1998) that activity conceptualizations involve dynamic 
blending of identities, another aspect of learning that occurs as action that may not be 
deliberately planned. For example, FMARS crew members are always improvising their 
roles, as seen through their prior conceptualizations (e.g., “being a scientist on an 
expedition” “being a NASA representative”). In some respects, the interleaving of actions 
in different parallel activity conceptualizations models this blending in Brahms. 
3.2 Planning Meeting Model Details 
To create a model of the planning meeting, Brodsky and Clancey analyzed the time lapse 
video and wrote elaborate descriptions of the chronology of events. The following 
excerpt uses formatting to indicate the located activities of AGENTS using o bj e c t s : 
RZ requests weather info f iom BC. (They need it to decide whether to go for EVA). 
BC gets up from his chair, walks to workstation area, to his laptop (in a 
subarea), and checks weather report for  -7 min; sitting facing laptop). Afer BC 
is done, he walks back to wardroom table area, approaches his chair area, and 
sits down on his chair. He then communicates the weather data back to RZ. 
Shortly after BC goes to check the weather, RZ gets up f iom his chair, walks to 
water tank area, climbs the water tank ladder, and checks water level (3y 
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looking into the water t a n k  -standing on the ladder at the uppev rim of water 
tank level, facing it). 
On this basis, Brahms locations, agents, activities, and objects are related by declaring 
group-agent-activity relationships and writing workframes. For example, one part of the 
above sequence of events is modeled by this workframe (Brahms language constructs 
appear in bold): 
workframe CheckWaterLevel 
when (unknown(current. timeToFil1 WaterTank)) 
detectable DetectWaterLevel { 
detect((WaterTank.waterLeve1 = 0)) 
then continue;} 
Walk( Galley LadderArea); 
Upladder(WaterTankArea); 
CheckWaterLevelO ; 
Downladder( Galley LadderArea) ; 
Walk(WardroomTab1eArea); 
conclude((current.waterLevelChecked = true)); 
do { GehpO; 
The sequence of subactivities in the do part are all defined by other workframes, most of 
which use the move primitive activity. 
After the simuIation is run, the modeler may display agent actions using the 
Agentviewer (Figure 3). While RZ is checking the water level, BC is checking the 
weather report. Figure I shows this moment graphically using the Brahms Virtual 
Environment (BrahmsVE; Damer 2004). 
In the 2002 implementation, the simulation output is recorded in a database and 
mapped by BrahmsVE onto graphic primitives and scripts. The scripts generate short, 
agent specific movements or gestures, such as walking up the ladder. In general, the 
scripts are created by analyzing photographs and videos, then developing storyboards, as 
if creating a cartoon or movie (Figure 5) .  These were reviewed for accuracy and 
plausibility, based on the ethnographer's memory and records of events. For example, 
whether people would be able to or choose to squeeze between CC and the table instead 
of walking around is a matter of practice and should be rendered accurately. In general, 
the simulation might generate interactions that are not based on specific events; these 
must be evaluated for plausibility based on similar known events. 
i n  
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Figure 3. Brahrns Agentviewer showing actions, communications, and 
inferences of agents RZ, BC, and VP during the first part of the planning 
meeting. At the time RZ does CheckWaterLevel, he is simultaneously engaged 
in' Planning, Covering AgendaItemWeather and Covering AgendaItemWater: 
Figure 4. Frame 3:24 from animation showing RZ checking the water level 
while BC is reading the weather report at his workstation [9:25: 191. 
Developed by Digitalspace Corporation. 
To illustrate the interface between Brahms simulation engine and the rendering 
system, consider the simple example of RZ doing the action: move 
1 1  
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Upladder(BaseAreaDef loc) {max-duration: 5 ;  location: loc;) where loc is 
GalleyLadderArea. A program called 0 World Service converts this simulation event into 
ihe foiiowing scheduled animation: 
activitylmovej 1641 169[projects. 
fmarsvre.RZlUpladder/ lprojects. 
fmarsvre. Galle yLadderArea1 
projects. fmarsvre. WaterTark4rea 
Another program, 0 World Parser (implemented as Javascript in Adobe@ AtmosphereTM), 
sends this scheduled animation to the BrahmsVE agent object queue. The RZ agent’s 
Upladder action script executes the movement details. Figure 4 shows one of the frames. 
\ 
RZ 
BC 
‘r 
d’ 
Figure 5. Initial storyboard showing ending of the planning meeting 
(Digitalspace Corporation). 
All together, three complex FMARS scenarios are simulated in BrahmsVE: the 
planning meeting (requiring 200 OWorld scripts), filling the water tank (67 scripts), and 
the EVA preparation (gathering equipment and helping each other don space suits, 423 
scripts). 
In this implementation, the rendering occurs in batch mode, after the simulation is 
completed. The timings of primitive motions and renderings are adjusted dynamically by 
the individual scripts, so they properly add up to the durations of Brahms activities. For 
example, a primitive activity in Brahms such as moving to the Galley Ladder Area, 
would require seven animation scripts, for getting out of a chair and walking, which 
together should total the five seconds declared in the Brahms model: . Head Track Horizontal 
Head Track Vertical . Stand Up From Chair 
Walk 
1 1  
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Turn While Walking 
= Idle Standing(s) 
Breathe 
The idle animations (e.g., shifting weight, moving arms) are random within the 
available time. Timing of primitive motions and renderings are not hard-coded in scripts, 
rather scripts are designed to play faster or slower to take the amount of time the Brahms 
model requires. An animation such as walking may take five seconds in real time, but if 
told by Bralilis to take two, it will be accelerated, or it could be slowed if necessary. 
Waypoints must be specified by the graphic designers (one purpose of the storyboards), 
so the agents don’t run through objects or into each other. Primitive motions refer to the 
waypoints in a general way, so they needn’t be encoded in the script itself. 
Using BrahmsVE, an analyst can now visualize postures and layout of the planning 
meeting. For example, one can see how R Z  sits alone on one long end of the table (Figure 
l), which is not visible in the Agentviewer. In effect, the graphic scripts of BrahmsVE 
represent part of the practice of the activity-the details of how people sit and move. 
3.3 Modeling Biological Motives and Behaviors vs. Goals 
Developing a multiagent model of a day in the life of the F U R S  crew naturally leads to 
including biological drivers of behavior, such as fatigue, hunger, and the need to use the 
bathroom. Such aspects of human behavior are ignored by most cognitive models (but see 
CLARION in Part 2 of this volume), but are emphasized by the discipline of psychology 
and design called human factors (e.g., Kantowitz and Sorkin 1983). Thus, a Brahms 
activity model provides a way to relate human factors concerns to cognition. 
An activity model necessarily reveals that how people accomplish tasks within an 
activity (e.g., recording data while working at the computer in the workstation area) is 
affected by biological concerns (e.g., interrupting work in order to put on a sweater). At 
the same time, activities such as eating are interleaved with group activities (such as the 
planning meeting) and how they are carried out reflects the group’s norms (e.g., one may 
get something to eat during an FMARS meeting, but would only do this in a business 
office setting if the food were already laid out for the participants in the meeting room). 
In the FMARS simiiIation; biorogical needs are modeled in a simple way; the initial 
research objectives did not require replicating the state of the art of physiological 
modeling. Each factor is represented by a single parameter (physical energy, hunger, 
urine in the bladder) that accumulates over time and is reset by a compensating action 
(rest, eating, elimination). 
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Fignre 5. Brahm AgentViewer display of KQ Eizticg En~ck dixing the 
planning meeting. This is a workframe within the Planning activity. Eating the 
snack is itself a composite activity, involving a sequence of conditional 
actions, including moving and getting food. 
The inclusion of biological motives in explaining human behavior provides an 
interesting problem for cognitive modeling. For example, consider KQ warming her 
drink in the microwave and then standing by the side of the table (Figures 1 & 6). There 
are many explanations for this behavior: Her drink may be cold; she might be cold; her 
back may hurt; she may be bored with the meeting; someone at the table who hasn’t had 
a shower in a week may smell. etc. One doesn’t know her goals, aside from, perhaps, 
warming her drink. Even this may be a kind of convenient cover for accomplishing her 
“real intention.” 
Perhaps most interesting, the single action of standing to the side may be satisfying for 
several reasons, none of which need be conscious (i.e., deliberately reasoned to create a 
plan that the action carries out). Behavior may be determined by many physiological, 
personal, and social functions at the same time, and these need not be articulated or 
distinguished by the person. A functional (goal-based) analysis tends to ascribe a single 
purpose to an action. A broad analysis of a day-in-the-life of the FMARS crew shows that 
of course all human activity is purposeful, but not every activity accomplishes a task (Le., 
the work of the crew) nor can it easily be assigned to a single goal (i.e., a conscious 
proposition). This follows especially from the subsumption architecture in which multiple 
activity conceptualizations on different levels are affecting behavior by inhibiting, 
enabling, or blending actions (e.g., people in a meeting conventionally wait for an 
appropriate moment to use the bathroom). In contrast, when the crew discusses what 
EVA to do on this day, including where to go for what purpose, including what 
equipment and who should go, they are clearly engaged in goal articulation and planning. 
What is revealing is how much else is occurring that is modulated by perception of the 
environment and each other, physiological needs, and relationships (e.g., how people sit 
at the table, who chooses to remain silent)-modeled in the FMARS simulation without 
reasoning about goals and alternative plans of action. 
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Conventional goalhask, analysis is a descriptive abstraction of human behavior, 
imposed by an observer, which may be an agent doing an activity. Goalhask analysis has 
implied that every human behavior has a direct goal as its cause (i.e., knowledge explains 
behavior). In contrast, the subsumption architecture in Brahms represents a conceptual 
nesting of activities, each of which has many implicit goal structures, so any behavior 
may make sense from multiple perspectives. It is far from clear whether KQ stands for 
one reason or five. (Notice how the “rationalist” framework suggests analyzing behavior 
in terms of reasons or reasoning.) Did a combination of activations cause her to stand at 
that time or were other satisfying relations emergent in the action (e.g., standing aside, 
she discovered that she related to the conversation better as an observer than as a direct 
participant)? It is highly problematic (if not theoretically impossible) to uniquely explain 
by subgoals behaviors that have not been deliberately planned3. Instead, a Brahms 
activity model represents the context in which the behavior occurs and (ideally) 
descriptively captures all gross movements, sequences, and communications. A goal- 
subgoal analysis can always be imposed later, and certainly a task analysis is necessary 
far designing layouts, procedures, work flow tools, etc. 
4. Discussion: Lessons about Activity Modeling 
This section considers lessons about the use of the virtual environment interface, 
methodology of constructing a Brahms model, how individual behaviors reflect and 
reinforce group dynamics, the relation of cognitive modeling and social interaction, and 
what can be learned by reconsidering Newell’s social band framework. The section 
concludes with some remarks about applications of multiagent simulations like FMARS 
to failure analysis. 
4.1 Use of the virtual environment interface 
The most important finding about the graphic interface is that it is not merely a display, 
but rather constitutes a second simulation--of the physical world-that must be 
integrated with the perceptual and action multiagent model. That is, the modeler relegates 
to the virtual world simulation the physics of the real world influencing where and how 
agents and objects move (e.g., the microgravity of the InternationaI- Space Station), line 
of sight, auditory range, and placement of objects on surfaces. In general, one would 
incorporate an anthropometric (human body) model, representing reachability and 
physical coordination in moving and holding objects. Work is underway to integrate the 
BrahmsVE with the agent simulation engine such that primitive actions with fixed 
durations and location would be modified during the physical simulation in the virtual 
environment. This is important not only for computing appropriate motion paths, but also 
to enable interruption of movements, for example, to allow to agents to encounter each 
We distinguish sensory stimuli (e.g., an odd feeling in the body), perceptual 
categorization (e.g., reco,gnizing hunger), and conceptualization of a goal (e.g., “I will get 
something to eat”). Some perceptual categorizations may be reactive and not 
conceptually coordinated, as occurs in the stroop task, where the meaning of a word and 
its physical color conflict. Goal conceptualizations may also form reactively (which is 
one interpretation of KQ’s standing), without reasoning about alternative motives, 
subgoals, or methods (i.e., deliberative planning). 
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other on the ladder and have a conversation. In effect, the notion of a primitive activity is 
fully open in Brahms, both to the purposes of the model (e.g., is fidelity in modeling the 
hand required?) and the possible interactions that may occur between objects, agents, and 
the facility (e.g., an open stateroom door enables calling someone from outside). 
The virtual environment itself was first conceived as an appropriate way to both 
construct and view Brahms simulations. The browser-based, distributed nature of the 
interactive 3D Adobe@ AtmosphereTM platform enables collaborative design and 
engineering, by which a common virtual world (e.g., FMARS) incorporates avatars 
(Darner 1997) that may interact with simulated agents, objects, and each other. In 
general, this could be a suitable framework for teleoperating teams of robots, especially 
with astronauts present, such as constructing and maintaining a lunar base. A more 
futuristic application would involve uploading agents to deep space such as to Mars or 
asteroids, where a time delay prevents conversation with Earth. Astronauts could 
converse with simulated agents, surrogates for human counterparts on Earth (e.g., the 
remote science team and specialized engineers), serving as coaches or assistants in real- 
time during Mars operations. The resulting interactions could be transmitted back to 
Earth and replayed to analyze and improve the work system design. 
4.2 Mcthodology of constructing a Brahms model 
The experiment of constructing a day-in-the-life FMARS model has reinforced the view 
that a Brahms model is a way of stating and organizing information about a work system. 
For example, after creating the model, Clancey received from CC a paper (Cockell et al. 
2003) about doing biology in FMARS. The paper includes CC‘s view of his daily 
schedule. Using the full-day F U R S  model, one could verify whether his summary fits 
what was observed (including time-lapse data). 
CC distinguishes in his experience between an EV.4 day and a sample analysis day. A 
typical day includes an EVA, but not everyone goes out every day, and the model does 
not include what CC does on “an analysis day.” The lesson learned is that simulating a 
sequence of multiple days is a heuristic for capturing work practices. Also, a simple 
interview may have revealed this distinction; one could ask, “Do spend your time in the 
same way every day?” 
CC gives details about his scientific work that were not recorded or modeled (e.g., the 
names of his tools and their parts, and the lab equipment is in sequential order for sample 
processing). He says he performed a procedure 100 times in two weeks; to verify this 
claim, another recording method is required, such as time-lapse on the lower deck or a 
log book near CC’s microscope. He also tells us that he sent images to a colleague, an 
activity that was not observed, but might be learned by examining his email record. 
The idea of modeling “a day in the life” is a starting point. The FMARS day simulated 
in Brahms is not intended to be a particular day, but a pastiche, something generalized 
from the available data, a ,typical day. The next step might be to refine the overall pattern 
to characterize types of typical days. Certainly modeling a sequence of days is as 
important for real applications (e.g., instruction and developing work flow tools) as 
having a full-day model. 
Cockell et al. (2003) relate that CC had to abort his analysis work at one point to 
provide support for an EVA team, indicating how he detected the need for assistance: 
“during the science activity it is necessary for the scientist to be concentrating but aware 
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of other activities.. .having an EVA radio close-by.” This shows how an overarching 
activity (being the EVA support person) blends with a familiar activity (writing a paper), 
so it is carried out in a different modality. Fwthermore, he says he was “constantly 
shuttling” between the decks. Time-lapse data provides the frequency on some days. If 
that were in the model, the statistics could be provided to Cockell for his own report. 
Related work by Clancey during NASA’s Haughton-Mars Project in 2003 showed that 
people were not accurate in estimating how often they were interrupted and for how long 
(e.g., a group stopped to navigate during an EVA every 3.7 minutes on average, while 
they estimated they drove for ten minutes between stops). These data suggest that people 
in highly interactive settings prone to interruption are not aware of the broader structure 
of emergent patterns, including the frequency of events. The analysis and simulation of 
group behavior is obviously of great value for capturing and visualizing these patterns. 
Developing a model of social behavior consequently has a special challenge that 
conventional cognitive modeling may not-patterns are often undetected by participants 
who are immersed in the setting, and even an observer may miss the regularities. A 
striking example Clancey’s (2001) analysis of the Haughton-Mars expedition in 1999, 
revealing that what people called the “work tent” was most often visited for less than two 
minutes, and was in fact primarily a place for storing things. This pattern was not 
detected while working inside the tent, but was only clear from the statistical analysis of 
the group’s behavior over a day, which time-lapse video allowed. Thus, some means is 
required for capturing located behaviors over time, so that what individuals are doing 
becomes visible. The statistical patterns (e.g., f’requency of interruption) may be emergent 
in the simulation as it is run for many simulated hours, but one must somehow learn what 
activities are occurring. An observer working in a “work tent,” will not easily see all the 
people coming and going, because they are part of the background and tuned out like so 
many gnats. In contrast, a conventional cognitive model is constructed from a task whose 
parameters are fully defined by the modeler, and all that must be observed are operations 
for transforming the materials or describing the situation. 
In summary, a fundamental problem in constructing a model of social behavior is 
knowing what everyone is doing at all times. A Brahms model provides a way of 
organizing observations (and redesigns), so particular information can be easily viewed 
and brought into juxtaposition and related. Conventional ethnographic text (e.g., field 
notes or analytic memo) does not enable relating data in this way. As the examples 
illustrate, it is particularly interesting to attempt to discover and replicate frequencies of 
recurrent events, such as how often people are interrupted in their work setting. 
4.3 How individual behaviors reflect and reinforce group dynamics 
Throughout the FMARS analysis we have been struck by how individual behavior 
ranging from seconds to minutes is sensitive to other people’s interpretations and actions. 
A good example is the process by which individuals stop what they are doing and arrive 
at the meeting. As known from common experience, groups tolerate varying degrees of 
lateness, and in a situation where communication is possible, as in the FMARS habitat, 
one may negotiate the start of the meeting (“I just need a few minutes to finish 
[photographing this rock slice]”). 
More interesting is how people notice, through their peripheral awareness of the group 
arriving at the table, that they must hurry. For example, someone on the lower deck can 
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hear the difference between four people at the table and two, and may notice that he/she 
is now alone. Whether a meeting starts on time and how an individual may cause others 
to wait is a paradigmatic norm for the group. More broadly, how individuals balance their 
own agendas as scientists (with papers and sponsors to satisfy) against the group’s 
objectives and imposed responsibilities ( e g ,  chores) is starkly revealed when individual 
work is simulated within a day-in-the-life context. This is a rich phenomenon for further 
investigation. How are individuals rationalizing their actions, and where do they draw the 
line in compromising or adapting their original plans as problems such as resource 
constraints develop within the group? 
Finally, the effort to graphically render the FMARS Brahms simulation has allowed us 
to model gestures, routes, and field of view, though none of these are yet incorporated in 
the simulated agents’ perception and hence do not affect simulated actions. Research 
continues to close the loop so the physics model in BrahmsVE feeds back to the 
simulation while it is running, thus routes will affect how long a movement takes, and 
fields of view (and hearing) will affect what the agent can perceive. Modeling an agent’s 
perception of gestures and rekiting then to individual behzivior is complex, but is 
fundamental for relating cognition to social behavior. Figure 7 provides a glimmer of 
what could be involved. 
Figure 7. Unusual posture at end of planning meeting. Square standing 
distribution suggests a balanced or stable relationship. Individuals move into 
and hold the encounter in this position. Possibly an important issue is being 
reconsidered. 
4.4 Distinguishing ways of working together 
Another understanding that has resulted from this work is recognizing that people are 
often working together but not collaborating. For example, the group sometimes sits in 
the habitat, reading and working on computers without talking, in effect, “working 
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together alone” (Figure 8). They are cooperating in sharing a resource (the facility), but 
not working on the same project. 
Figure 8. - 
collaboratixig. FMARS initial habitation, August 2000 
without 
The FMARS investigation,’ plus related work studying field scientists (2004b), has 
Coordination: Sharing a common resource via scheduling or ordering, without 
requiring changes to how individuals or subgroups behave, e.g., sharing the 
habitat’s “mess table” during the day. Literally, “co-ordinating,” ordering in time 
and place to avoid any possible interference with others’ activities. 
Cooperation: Sharing a common resource in a way that requires adjusting how 
individuals or subgroups carry out an activity, e.g., sharing space on the table 
during the meeting. Literally, “co-operating,” operating in a way that relates 
individual actions in time and place. Work flow typically describes how different 
functional roles cooperate, with one product feeding into another task. 
Working on a common project, e.g., most of the planning 
meeting is devoted to the daily EVA, which will require three or four members of 
the crew to work together for half of the day or more. Literally, “co-laboring,” 
conceiving and carrying out a single project. Most generally, this is a triad, two or 
more agents (or groups) and a group. The relation is in general asymmetric: A and 
B collaborate on a project originated by A (but might do no work together on B’s 
project). For example, a geologist may help a biologist do a study in the field, but 
the biologist doesn’t contribute to the geologist’s investigation (Clancey 2004b). 
“Working quietly in the hab” is a cooperative group activity, in which individuals 
pursue their own agendas. In general, the crew’s schedule is designed to balance 
collaborations (common projects) with individual agendas stemming from personal 
needs and interests (e.g., reading a book about the Arctic), disciplinary specialization 
(e.g., microphotography), and institutional commitments (e.g., writing a column for a 
suggested the following distinctions: 
. 
Collaboration: 
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news organization). Understanding the relation between individual drivers of behavior 
and group activities is a fundamental aspect of understanding how cognition relates to 
social interactions. 
4.5 Summary of relation between cognitive modeling and social interaction 
To summarize the example and discussion to this point, consider some of the questions 
posed by Sun (this volume) for relating cognitive modeling and social interactions: 
What are the appropriate characteristics of cognitive architectures for modeling 
both individual cognitive agents and multi-agent interactions? 
Experience constructing six work practice models in Brahms suggests that 
the following Brahms language features are relevant: 
a. Subsumption architecture for conceptualization of activity 
b. Physical layout of facilities modeled explicitly; all behaviors are loca?ed 
c. Communication of beliefs (Ask and Tell) 
d. Context-dependent perception (activity-specific detectables) 
e. Interruption of activities based on priorities and detected conditions 
f. Model representational objects that agents can read and write (e.g., 
documents) 
What are the fundamental ways of understanding and modeling multi-agent 
interactions? How much can they be reduced to individual cognition? 
a. Reductionism is inappropriate; it is better to begin by asking: How can 
patterns of social interactions emerge from individual cognition and 
behaviors? What is the nature and role of subconscious perception of 
interactions by individuals (cf. Figure 7)? 
b. Ethnography (participant observation) is the fundamental way of 
understanding and modeling multi-agent interactions: photos, video, time- 
lapse, activity mapping (person, time, place) (Clancey 2001 ; 2004a, b; 
Jordan 1992; Scribner & Sachs 1991; Wynn 1991). 
c. As a heuristic, model at least a day in the life of the group (24 hours); 
move to multiple days as soon as practical; especially, consider the rhythm 
of a week (Clancey 2002a). 
d. Model both group and individual activities; consider how the methods for 
accomplishing goals are adapted in cooperative activities; recognize that 
not all group activities are collaborative. 
What additional representations.. .are needed in cognitive modeling of multi- 
agent interactions? 
a. Activities (including motives, goals, operations) described by Activity 
Theory (Leont’ev 1979) 
b. Biological needs (fatigue, hunger, toilet, cold) affect choice of activity and 
manner of carrying it out. 
c. Perception of posture, attitude, tone of voice, etc. affect relationships (not 
included in Brahms). 
d. Perception of space, line of sight, voices (e.g., to determine paths, what is 
visible, what can be heard) 
e. Facilities ( e g ,  lack of proper heating at FMARS, available work space) 
influence personal experience and attitude towasds cooperation. 
1) 
2) 
3 )  
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4) How can we best characterize and model social relations, structures, and 
organizations in relation to individual cognition? 
a. 
b. 
C. 
d. 
e. 
f. 
g . 
h. 
1. 
j .  
k. 
- 
See 2d 
In a multiagent simulation, social structure can be modeled in terms of the 
activities of groups to which agents belong. 
Model roles (e.g., meteorologist) and identities (e.g., graduate student) as 
inherited group behaviors. 
Model behaviors descriptively: What individuals do when and where for 
how long-do not focus on goals and tasks. 
Model the broad activity chronology of a day and refine to tasks to the 
level required for the application of the model 
Focus on how group activities begin, the norms for how they are carried 
out, and how they are brought to a closing 
Attempt to model belief change as much as possible in terms of 
communication, perception, and forward-chaining; goal-directed inference 
occurs during planning activities ( e g ,  deciding what to do next)--observe 
why and how often it occurs 
Do a statistical analysis of where people are located and what they are 
doing throughout a day 
Observe reminders and peripheral attending (how individuals keep each 
other synchronized); group and individual tolerance for delays 
Consider how the group decides whose knowledge will be called into play 
and how individual methods of working are facilitated, blended, or 
inhibited by the group’s schedule, other goals, or conflicting modes of 
operation (e.g., when one is driving in a caravan during an EVA it may be 
impossible to stop and take photographs) 
Recognize that some social patterns (e.g., paths left by ATVs) may be 
perceived and direct individual behavior; others may be only tacitly 
conceived and yet be influencing individual behavior (e.g., how people 
arrange themselves and interact, Figures 1,2, 7, and 8). 
This outline resembles more a list of examples-than a comprehensive perspective and 
goes beyond what is incorporated in the planning model. Thus at least from the 
perspective of this project it represents the edge of scientific understanding. 
4.6 Relation to Newell’s Social Band Framework 
One way of appraising progress is to compare the FMARS planning model to Newell’s 
(1991) discussion of the “social band” in Unified Theories of Cognition. Newell’s 
position was comprehensive and contains many sound pieces of advice: “models of the 
individual as intelligent agents interacting with . . . real worlds would seem essential” (p. 
493). The aspect of his analysis that appears perhaps most foreign are the “system levels” 
called “bands.” By analogy to physical computer systems, the bands are defined in terms 
of time scales, with the social band having ”time units” of days to months (p. 152). In 
contrast, simulating the most simple norms, such as standing at a table during a meeting, 
involves momentary dynamics of perceiving and moving within a conceptualization of 
the conscious person (“what I’m doing now,” Clancey 1999). 
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Possibly Newell viewed “social” as just meaning direct, physical interaction with 
others: “As the time scale increases from days to weeks to months, the systems involved 
become social. They comprise multiple individuals in interaction. Humans do not lead 
solitary lives at the level of days and above” (p. 154). The idea that all human activity is 
socially conceived (in terms of the norms of roles, methods, purpose), so solitary activity 
is always inherently social, was apparently not part of Newell’s notion of social or his 
notion of knowledge. He viewed knowledge as ”socially conditioned’‘ (p. 490) as 
opposed to being formulated in social terms (“who am I being now?” Clancey 1997a). 
Anderson (2002) makes a similar conclusion: “Newell thought that issues of cognitive 
architecture became relatively unimportant at the Rational Band and were completely 
irrelevant at the Social Band” (p. 3-4). Indeed, Anderson disagrees with Newell: “fine- 
grained temporal factors at the Biological Band do influence higher-level outcomes” (p. 
4). But Anderson’s analysis focuses on the mechanism of “unit-task“ learning, rather than 
the individual’s conceptualization of motivation and value (Lave & Wenger 1991)- 
social factors that explain why learning is occurring at all. 
Newell claimed that “the group’s behavior is explainable and predictable by its use of 
knowledge in service of its goals” (p. 154). This is by definition true when one constructs 
a model that refers to conditional actions as “knowledge“ and describes all behavior as 
deriving from goals. However, as shown in this chapter, other kinds of models are 
possible. More generally, a group’s behavior is explainable and predictable by 1) 
interacting normative behaviors of individuals ( e g ,  when the planning meeting begins 
depends on how long they delay after the commander’s call to order) and 2) habitual 
patterns of “how we do things,” which are not all scheduled or reasoned about in plans 
(e.g., sharing hot water during breakfast, allowing people to stand during the middle of a 
meeting). 
Referring to all human behaviors as determined by goals and knowledge seems 
inappropriate when a day in the life of a group such as the FMARS crew is considered. 
The task-goal-knowledge analysis applies best when people are working on specific 
tasks, focusing on using laboratory equipment, downloading and analyzing EVA science 
data, or preparing a meal. Put another way, at the time scale of 10 seconds or more- 
Newell’s “Intendedly Rational Band” (p. l 50)-behavior is both deliberately reasoned 
about and habitually patterned by previous interactions. Although one may ignore 
biological impulses during intendedly rational activities (e.g., continuing to read a 
fascinating book chapter despite having the urge to use the bathroom), all behaviors are 
always in a social context, that is, they are conceived with respect to social norms, 
relations, and values. People frame their activity in terms of their socially constructed 
identities; this determines what they do, when, where, and how, including what problems 
they discover or tackle and what methods they use to resolve them (for elaboration, see 
Clancey 2002b). 
In summary, the heuristic of modeling a day in the life of a group living and working 
together reveals an interaction of biological, task-oriented cognitive, and social influences 
that cannot be separated into temporal bands. Social behavior is not only occurring (or 
rolling up) over longer time scales as Newell posits, in the manner of individual actions 
accumulating into a social history or a person being forced to interact with others (e.g., 
going to the store to buy milk). The “bands” in Newell’s analysis are not isolated systems 
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in practice. Different emergent aspects of the scene (biological, task-goal oriented, and 
collective) causally influence each other: 
Biology and culture interpenetrate in an inextricable manner.. . .. 
Individuals are not real and primary, with collectivities.. .merely 
constructed from their accumulated properties. Cultures make individuals 
too; neither comes first, neither is more basic.. . . Thus, we cannot factor a 
complex social situation into so much biology on one side, and so much 
culture on the other. (Gould, 1987, p. 153) 
Cognition-whether the person is physically alone or in a group-is immersed in norms 
and emergent physiological, physical, and cooperative constraints (Wynn 199 l)4. 
4.7 Application to failure analysis 
Because NASA’s failure analysis reports (e.g., CAIB 2003) consistently emphasize social 
problems, it is worth considering how a Brahms activity analysis might be useful in 
understanding or identifying organizational and cultural problems in a highly structured 
task setting. One approach is to represent how people are actually conceiving of a given 
activity in broad terms. For example, as MER scientists are working at JPL during a Mars 
rover mission, do they conceive of their activity as geologists exploring Mars or see the 
mission through the eyes of the “flight control” team operating a rover? How do these 
conceptions interact as concerns in practice and influence the quality of the outcome from 
scientific and engineering perspectives? Notice how this analysis is different from a task 
model that frames the problem in one way (e.g., controlling the rover) or uses a multi- 
taslung or linear architecture (e.g., first I solve the geology planning problem, then I salve 
the flight control sequencing problem). In practice, these tasks are not strictly partitioned 
into different roles, nor when they are separated organizationally can the constraints be 
strictly ordered. An activity analysis asks how a given individual might be blending 
alternative ways of perceiving, interpreting, and acting, such that they experience 
conflicts in their jud-went (e.g., as a geologist, I’d first take a look over the top of thls 
crater I’m standing in and possibly return, but the mission success criteria imply that the 
rover’s path must omit loops). In a task analysis, these are just “conflicting goals.” 
One purpose of a social simulation of work practices is to understand how “intendedly 
rational” behaviors fail to accomplish goals within broader time scales because behavior 
derives from norms and emotions, and not just local reasoning about technical matters. 
An example appears in the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report (2003), 
involving a management meeting that reviewed and accepted a faulty tile damage 
analysis. People based decisions on previous interpretations of similar problems and 
scheduling constraints for subsequent launches. A social analysis is required to explain 
why knowledge and concerns of individuals and subteams were not brought to bear. In 
this case the norms of management prevented specialists from getting data they needed to 
support their tentative damage analyses, creating a Catch-22 situation. 
The Columbia disaster highlights how the group‘s roles, schedules, and even 
representational practices (e.g., Powerpoint bullets, Tufte 2003, pp. 7- 1 1) determine the 
salience of events-how to evaluate a situation, what effects are important, and hence 
For a more detailed discussion, see the chapter “Dialectic Mechanism” in Clancey 4 
(1997b) as well as the discussion of Maturana’s “structural coupling” (p. 89). 
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what constitutes a problem and how or to what extent it is resolved. The FMARS models 
shows how cognitive modeling might apply to real-world applications by developing a 
multiagent simulation, with multiple groups interacting over a day or more. Just as 
conventional task analysis works backwards from goals to knowledge, an activity-based 
analysis works backwards from the quality of the work product (e.g., ways in which it 
fails) to the representations (e.g., presentations at meetings), interactive patterns (e.g., 
how time is allocated during a meeting), and norms of authority that influence who may 
speak to whom about what, when and where. Modeling these relations and effects in 
Brahms in a general way is an open research problem. 
How were people during the Columbia management meetings conceiving of their 
activity? Planning for the next launch or trying to return the crew safely? Were they 
conceiving the meeting as managing the agenda (Le., controlling who participates and 
how) or trying te ferret out and understand anomalies? Of special interest to the 
Columbia analysis are informal (not role or task-defined) communications by which 
people assist or influence each other, a consideration naturally revealed when a modeler 
focuses on describing behaviors instead of only goals and inferences. In other words, 
communication of information is not necessarily traceable to missing or wrong technical 
knowledge, but instead will point to misconceptions about practice, a presumption about 
how the work is supposed to be done, including especially lines of authority and when 
and how people are allowed to influence the group’s work. Thus modeling how people 
conceive of their activity, which is always pervaded by social relations, is essential for 
explaining human behavior. This is a very different kind of cognitive model than 
emphasized heretofore in understanding expertise and problem solving ability. 
5.  Summary 
Simulating an FMARS planning meeting in Brahms produced several surprises: 
”Off-task” activities of eating, resting, using the toilet, and recreation (e.g., 
playing games or talking at the table) must be included in a work practice 
simulation because they causally affect the duration, timing, and methods by 
which tasks are accomplished. 
Characteristics and experiences of people often studied by human factors 
specialists (e.g., hunger and fatigue), which are typically excluded from cognitive 
models, must be included a work practice simulation because they determine 
when off-task activities occur. 
Everyday behaviors, such as getting something to eat, are carried out according to 
norms, but improvised in a way (e.g., standing while eating during a meeting) that 
exercise the open nature of norms, while possibly accomplishing many goals 
simultaneously. Such behaviors appear to blend rituals or habits with both pre- 
meditated intentions and emergent affects (e.g., calling attention to oneself and 
hence being better able to influence the decisions being made). 
The non-irnmersive virtual display of BrahmsVE, which was at first considered to 
be only a “visualization tool,” provides a means of simulating line of sight and 
movement paths, information that is essential for simulating what agents can 
detect in the environment and how long movement between two points requires. 
The heuristics of modeling a full “day in the life” of the habitat and simulating all agent 
movements and use of tools were crucial for making these discoveries. 
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The modeling experiment shed a different light on what cognition accomplishes and 
how perception and action are related through conceptualization of activity. For example, 
a conventional cognitive model of a planning meeting would focus on the discourse 
structure of the meeting’s conversation. Such fine-grained explanations of topic 
relationships, based on the semantics of what is being presented, explained and decided, 
might be improved by including what the FMARS model focused upon: postures (e.g., 
which may convey boredom or disagreement to participants), transitional activities (e.g., 
how individual agent behaviors become coordinated into a coherent group activity), and 
biological motives (e.g., fatigue, which may affect the meeting’s agenda). 
In some respects, behaviors emphasized in the FMARS model might be viewed as 
noise in a conventional discourse model. For example, it might appear humorous to ask a 
cognitive modeler, “What if the person is hungry and doesn’t want to continue talking?” 
Cognitive simulations often assume that people are motivated (i.e., the goals of the task at 
hand are not in question) and that work occurs in a controlled setting. The FMARS 
simulation emphasizes that the context includes people’s activities, which have both 
broad and narrow forms that influence what goals and methods are established, how they 
are adapted-affecting the quality of the resulting work. 
This chapter has focused on what can be learned fi-om the use of a virtual environment 
interface, the methodology of constructing a Brahms model ~f practice, how individual 
behaviors reflect and reinforce group dynamics, the relation of cognitive modeling and 
social interaction, and what can be learned by reconsidering Newell’s social band 
framework. The examples throughout illustrate many aspects of behavior that protocol 
analysis would not consider because they are visual relationships (e.g., how people stand 
when talking), off-task (Le., would not be included in an experimental setting that 
presents a task to a subject), and conceptualizations that are not articulated in common 
experience or sought in task-oriented studies (e.g., understanding of norms, how 
participation is negotiated). 
The observational methodology used in the FMARS study includes both systematic 
(e.g., time lapse video) and informal (e.g., field notes) records. By design, the recording 
is intended to record and learn more than can practically be analyzed, and thus (perhaps) 
include information that is only later found to be useful (as illustrated by the analysis of 
the July 13,2001 planning meeting). Clancey (in preparation a, b) shows how time lapse, 
diaries, and surveys can be systematically recorded and analyzed to produce information 
about productivity and work system design problems. 
The focus of the FMARS simulation is to provide a proof of concept that the 
simulation can fit what actually occurs. The main criteria used were the episodes visible 
on the time lapse (e.g., movement of crew members during the planning meeting for 
different reasons) and the duration of events. As discussed in considering CC’s report of 
his crew experiences, to more thoroughly verify the model would require simulating at 
least a week, which is well beyond what modeling resources have permitted. The present 
model includes three episodes identified as recurrent and involving distinctive 
combinations of attention and interpersonal interaction (the planning meeting, refilling 
the water tank, and preparing for an EVA, Clancey 2002a). From the perspective of 
practical design and ongoing Mars analog investigations, the most important scientific 
product of such research is identifying new issues to systematically study (e.g., the 
frequency of interruptions, Clancey in preparation b). 
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Although cognition is sometimes considered narrowly as relating goals, inference, and 
actions, cognitive science (as represented by the journal and society of that name) more 
broadly includes perception, the nature of conceptualization, social interaction during 
learning, and many other topics. This chapter focuses on relating collective (social) 
behavior to individual cognition (involving perception, motive, and action) by 
emphasizing that individual behaviors are conceptually coordinated with respect to an 
understanding of norms. Such an investigations touches upon the nature of culture, as 
embodied in individuals Gave 1988), and realized in episodes that exercise, extend, test, 
and interpret other people’s conception of how to behave. These normative behaviors 
include: What topics should be discussed when, by whom, and using what tools? 
Thus, the analysis presented is part of a much larger project that might examine the 
decisions made during the planning meeting, and tie them to interpretations of the 
group’s role structure, competing motivations, and so on. This analysis would again be 
primarily episodic until many such meetings had been analyzed and statistically related. 
The FMARS 2001 rotation studied here ended after a week, and the group never lived or 
worked together again. D.eveloping a full-fledged theory of such social interactions may 
therefore require a series of related studies in other contexts. 
Finally, the FMARS modeling experiment illustrates what mechanisms other than 
backward chaining of goals capture, given a focus on simulating the activities of a typical 
day, rather than automating a task. The project revealed the relation of different levels of 
analysis (biological, psychological, social). A contrast can be drawn with multiagent 
models that focus on functional actions. For example, Brahms’ design was inspired by 
the Phoenix system (Cohen, et al. 1989): which showed how an environment model of a 
fire-fighting setting interacted with a hierarchical communication and command 
structure. If modeling fire-fighting in Brahms using the same approach used for FMARS, 
one would model the entire day, including where the fire-fighters camp, how meals are 
prepared, how they are transported to the work site, etc. This day-in-the-life model would 
complement Cohen’s multiagent task analysis, revealing how social activities are 
interleaved with and constrain how work is actually done. 
Understanding the nature and influence of individual emotions, agendas, preferences, 
ambitions, etc. is a significant next step. Thus, the intersection of cognitive and social 
analyses broadens the research perspective-from what knowledge is required to 
accomplish a task, to why certain people are participating at all. How do leaders in high- 
risk situations manage fear and temerity in assigning individuals to tasks? To allowing 
someone to present a contrary view and plan to the group? A question for cognitive 
modeling then becomes, what knowledge and motives affect who is allowed to 
participate and in what manner? 
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